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Capital as Artificial Intelligence for 
“Fictions of Speculation”                 
(Journal of American Studies) 
 
Gerry Canavan 





A sort of machine à gouverner is thus now essentially in operation on 
both sides of the world conflict, although it does not consist in either case 
of a single machine that makes policy, but rather of a mechanistic 
technique which is adapted to the exigencies of a machine-like group of                  
men devoted to the formation of policy. 
 
      —Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings (1950)1 
 
Abstract:  
This article examines science fictional allegorizations of Soviet-style 
planned economies, financial markets, autonomous trading algorithms, and 
global capitalism writ large as nonhuman artificial intelligences, focusing 
primarily on American science fiction of the Cold War period. Key fictional 
texts discussed include Star Trek, Isaac Asimov’s Machine stories, Terminator, 
Kurt Vonnegut’s Player Piano (1952), Charles Stross’s Accelerando (2005), 
and the short stories of Philip K. Dick. The final section of the article discusses 
Kim Stanley Robinson’s novel 2312 (2012) within the contemporary political 
context of accelerationist anticapitalism, whose advocates propose working 
with “the machines” rather than against them. 
 “Financial markets, by and large,” notes Manuel Castells, “are 
outside anyone’s control. They have become a sort of automaton, with 
sudden movements that do not follow a strict economic logic, but a 
                                                          
1 Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1954), 182. 
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logic of chaotic complexity.”2 But this chaos is not the same as 
randomness; rather, it is “chaos” in the spirit of “chaos theory,” the 
strange loops and fractal patterns that emerge out of a sensitive 
dependence on starting conditions. Movements that may appear 
random or arbitrary on the local level contribute to this higher-order 
totality. “We live in a world of crises and convulsions; but this does not 
mean that our world is anarchic, or devoid of logic,” writes Steven 
Shaviro along precisely these lines. “If anything, the contemporary 
world is ruthlessly organized around an exceedingly rigid and 
monotonous logic. […] All impulsions of desire, all structures of feeling, 
and all forms of life, are drawn into the gravitational field, or captured 
by the strange attractor, of commodification and capital 
accumulation.”3 Such pronouncements apply a twenty- first century 
scientific register to Adam Smith’s familiar figuration of the “invisible 
hand,” in which the self-interested actions of each individual actor 
scale to “promote an end which was no part of his intention.”4 The end 
result of the “rigid and monotonous logic” of the chaotic movements of 
capital is the production of what appears to us as a kind of emergent 
intelligence, a non-biological subject that seems to think, though 
sometimes perhaps not all that well—a subject we sometimes 
apprehend as a perfectly rational calculator of values and other times 
as an irrational, highly “jittery” subject “with moods and volitions of its 
own.”5 Borrowing her terms from thinkers working in the philosophy of 
mind, N. Katherine Hayles has proposed the term “cognitive 
nonconscious” to describe the kind of unthinking decision-making 
agents, like markets, that arise as an emergent property out of 
systems of complex interactions. A market, Hayles notes, much like a 
biological organism, is adaptive and flexible; while not being self- 
aware, it nonetheless possesses a kind of cognition, with “sensing, 
processing, communicating, and actuating capabilities that surpass or 
in fact bypass human agency.” 
                                                          
2 Manuel Castells, The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, and Society        
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 87. Quoted in Shaviro, Connected, below. 
 
3 Steven Shaviro, Post Cinematic Affect (Washington: Zero Books, 2010), 131. 
 
4 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Digireads Publishing, 2004), 264. 
 
5 Steven Shaviro, Connected, or What It Means to Live in a Network Society (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 41. 
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The genre of speculative fiction (SF)6 has long given us the 
terms and tropes to think about such nonhuman, even non-conscious 
“minds”—and, indeed, the vocabulary of SF is typically an unavoidable 
reference in any conversation that seeks to take seriously the 
possibility of nonhuman agents acting in the world. This article 
therefore takes up science fiction’s treatment of markets as an 
emergent intelligence as a terrain for thinking through the sorts of 
worlds such market intelligences might produce. I link the way U.S. 
science fiction has historically imagined such intelligences to two 
moments in which such speculations have gained particular 
prominence: the mid-twentieth-century Cold War and its attendant, 
intertwined anxieties about totalitarianism and planned economies, 
and the contemporary neoliberal transformation of the economy via 
technological disruption and governmental deregulation. These visions 
of autonomous, agential economies gain particular urgency in our 
time, in which these once-fantastic science fictions are becoming more 
and more real; our automated cognitive systems exist in an 
accelerating “self-catalyzing feedback loop” with the accumulation of 
faster- than-human information-gathering, decision-making, and 
transaction-execution, catapulting the market system’s outcomes 
further and further from the realm of human comprehensibility, much 
less intervention or control.7 
“What We Call Freedom” 
One of the more archetypal Star Trek (1966-1969) story 
templates is the society (usually pastoral or primitivist) that is in thrall 
to a giant supercomputer (far beyond its apparent level of technology) 
which it reveres as a god, and whose inscrutable calculations organize 
every level of its civilization. This is, typically, a pretty good deal for 
the planetary culture: the computer ensures both social stability and 
individual happiness, and provides a certain level of material 
prosperity at or near the level of “paradise” with little or no violence or 
exploitation. But despite these benefits, the situation invariably 
                                                          
6 While some scholars find it useful to draw fine distinctions between science fiction, speculative 
fiction, SF, and other proposed names for the genre, for my purposes here I will use all three 
terms interchangeably. 
 
7 See Hayles’s talk “Material Processes & the Cognitive Nonconscious,” available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7iDL9yDH4ko#t=58. 
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offends Captain Kirk’s sense of human dignity, and so at the end of the 
episode he always destroys the machine, either by blowing it up 
directly or by exposing the computer to some does-not-compute 
logical paradox that causes it to malfunction or explode. 
A quintessential version of this story is “The Apple” (1967), from 
early in the second season, which explicitly (and repeatedly, almost to 
the point of exhaustion) links the pastoral society that Kirk chooses to 
destabilize with the Garden of Eden.8 The planet, as usual, is said to be 
a paradise, with temperature regulation in the tropical range all the 
way from the equator to the poles. The inhabitants not only have all 
their needs provided for, but also show no sign of disease or aging; Dr. 
McCoy can’t tell if they are 20 or 20,000 years old. Food, shelter, 
clothing, immortality—everything is provided for and administered by 
the god-computer Vaal. 
The stagnation implied by this “perfection” horrifies McCoy: 
“There are certain absolutes, Mr. Spock, and one of them is the right 
of humanoids to a free and unchained environment—the right to have 
conditions that permit growth. … There's been no progress here in at 
least ten thousand years. This isn't life. It's stagnation.” (Spock’s 
retort that another absolute is a society’s “right to choose a system 
which seems to work for them” goes unanswered.) In the end, of 
course, Kirk sides with McCoy, destroys the planetary god-computer 
that has organized all aspects of this society since time immemorial, 
and then gathers the people together to congratulate them on their 
new freedom: 
ALIEN MAN: But it was Vaal who put the fruit on the trees, 
caused the rain to fall. Vaal cared for us. 
KIRK: You'll learn to care for yourselves, with our help. And 
there's no trick to putting fruit on trees. You might enjoy it. You'll 
learn to build for yourselves, think for yourselves, work for 
yourselves, and what you create is yours. That's what we call 
freedom. You'll like it, a lot. And you'll learn something about men 
                                                          
8 Star Trek, “The Apple,” directed by Joseph Pevney (1967; Hollywood, CA, 2008: Paramount), 
Netflix. The original series crew encounters similar god-computers in “The Return of the 
Archons,” “For the World Is Hollow and I Have Touched the Sky,” “Shore Leave,” and “Spock’s 
Brain,” among others; the crew themselves are threatened with replacement by an autonomous 
artificial intelligence in “The Ultimate Computer.” 
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and women, the way they're supposed to be. Caring for each 
other, being happy with each other, being good to each other. 
That's what we call love. You'll like that, too, a lot. You and your 
children. 
ALIEN WOMAN: What are children? 
KIRK: The little ones? Look like you? Just go on the way 
you're going. You'll find out. 
The conflict between Kirk’s vision of radical freedom / 
backbreaking labor and Vaal’s offer of absolute security / 
infantilization—and all its many variations in the Star Trek canon and 
across Cold War SF more generally—plainly allegorizes the Cold War 
dispute between the “free market” of the West and the planned 
economy of Soviet-style communism. Friedrich Hayek could very well 
have quoted from McCoy’s speech in this episode when he warns, in 
his own 1967 Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, that “If 
the human intellect is allowed to impose a preconceived pattern on 
society, if our powers of reasoning are allowed to lay claim to a 
monopoly of creative effort… then we must not be surprised if society, 
as such, ceases to function as a creative force.”9 (Of course other 
markers in the episode point us strongly in the direction of Cold War 
allegory as well, from the Vietnam-like jungle appearance of the planet 
to Ensign Chekov’s remarkable assertion, early in the episode, that the 
Garden of Eden was “just outside Moscow.”) In these terms the 
episode’s moral is somewhat stunning: communism, Star Trek seems 
to be warning us, might make you happy, but it won’t make you good. 
The ideological hostility to a planned economy is so powerful that the 
episode’s ending gag somehow transfers the “Satanic” character of the 
Fall myth to Spock (who throughout the episode has advocated that 
the People of Vaal simply be left alone), even though within the logic 
of the tale it’s plainly Kirk who has played that disruptive, paradise-
destroying role. In this retelling of Genesis the snake was running the 
Garden, and God was somewhere outside; it’s little wonder that Kirk 
wants to shift the reference from Genesis to Exodus near the end of 
the episode, commanding his security officers to “let those people go” 
after Vaal is safely destroyed. 
                                                          
9 F.A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (London: Routledge, 1967; Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1967), 247. 
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A surface reading of “The Apple” thus transfers the very idea of 
economic forethought (however flawed or noble) onto the fantasy of a 
monstrous, fully alien system, utterly out of human control and utterly 
unaccountable to any human intervention, which can only be 
experienced as slavery-like constraint. From this perspective it’s no 
surprise that the People of Vaal are presented as if they are unable to 
live recognizably human lives at all while under the power of the 
machine; note that it falls to Kirk to give to them the (foundationally 
human) gifts of sex and parenthood. That Vaal is in fact successful at 
providing for a happy population—and that the People of Vaal don’t 
experience Vaal as oppressive—doesn’t figure into Kirk’s analysis at 
all, and if anything is only proof of the dangerous seductivity of 
unfreedom. In this episode and others, the inhumanity of a controlled 
economy gives Kirk the moral obligation to free culture after culture 
from this kind of domination, even if (as is certainly the case in “The 
Apple”) the tiny culture was perfectly happy before he arrived, and 
indeed seems to have absolutely no hope of surviving outside Vaal’s 
guidance: the tribe has neither the population size nor the collective 
knowledge to fend for itself. That offhand “with our help” in Kirk’s 
speech consequently becomes extremely important; Spock’s repeated 
reminders of Star Trek’s famously violable “Prime Directive” of non-
interference go completely unheeded in the face of McCoy and Kirk’s 
patronizing gunboat colonialism, which successfully opens up Gamma 
Trianguli Six to Federation “help” it had absolutely no need for before 
the Enterprise arrived. 
The irony is that, when taken to this extreme, the “planetary god” 
allegory for a planned economy inadvertently doubles as an allegory 
for the so-called “invisible hand” of the free market system as well. 
The market is similarly out of human control, and similarly 
unaccountable to human intervention; we are told, in fact, that the 
market’s brutal, unflinching efficiency is the chief argument in its 
favor. Paradoxically, here Hayek becomes in favor of an economic 
system’s inscrutable authority, even as it once again completely 
swamps the effort or rational designs of any individual: “Many of the 
greatest things man has achieved are not the result of consciously 
directed thought, and still less the product of a deliberately 
coordinated effort of many individuals, but of a process in which the 
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individual plays a part which he can never fully understand.”10 The 
spontaneous organization of market forces as they emerge, 
evolutionarily, from the salutary or maladaptive decisions of individual 
actors within the system is no less definitive than the deliberate 
decisions of a planned economy; market hegemony is thus revealed as 
itself a kind of totalitarianism, simply a benign one, an authoritarian 
logic that Hayek finds desirable because it represents a “combination 
of knowledge more extensive than a single mind can master.”11 
Precisely as with the once-lamented unfreedom of the planned 
economy of the infernal god-machine, neither the individual or the 
collective have any ability to choose against this emergent 
intelligence’s automatic determinations of what is good. Hayek himself 
concedes this paradox in an essay from 1945: “This is not a dispute 
about whether planning is to be done or not. It is a dispute as to 
whether planning is to be done centrally, by one authority for the 
whole economic system, or is to be divided among many individuals.”12 
The same irresistible determinative force that crushed freedom and 
growth somehow becomes a beneficent guiding hand when it is 
massively distributed and automatic rather than centralized and 
deliberate. 
Indeed, in our time, even more that during the original run of 
Star Trek, it is the market that is now personified as a calculating god 
that processes all data and makes all judgments better than any 
individual human—the market whose decisions are always final, even 
when they conflict with our notions of justice, ethics, value, happiness, 
or ecological sustainability. In our time it is the market that famously 
“speaks,” and we who must listen. This takes us a step beyond even 
Wiener’s “machine-like group of men devoted to the formation of 
policy” to something even more insidiously cybernetic; in the 
neoliberal moment, the ambition is that the machine of the market 
make policy directly, without any soft-hearted human intervention that 
                                                          
10 F.A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), 149-150. The 
essay from which the quote originates was originally printed between 1942 and 1944 as 
“Scientism and the Study of Society” in Economica 9 (1942): 267-291; Economica 10 (1943): 34-




12 F.A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review 35, no. 4: 519-30. 
Accessed online at http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw1.html. 
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might compromise the market’s efficiency or effectivity. The free 
market in this way can thus be seen as an immense, massively 
distributed, quasi-sentient hyperobject, one that might as well be self- 
aware whether that’s literally or provably so—a god-computer even 
more abstruse and monstrous than the old Soviet version, which for all 
its multiple and myriad flaws was (if only in name) directed towards 
the provision of human welfare. 
As Fredric Jameson has said of the inseparability of contemporary 
“transnational finance capitalism” and “cybernetics and the computer,” 
especially as it manifests in both contemporary cyberpunk fantasy and 
in the (im)material reality of wealth extraction in the digital age: 
 
As for planning, socialist or otherwise, what could be more 
complexly post- human than the attempt to direct the 
multiplicities of contemporary production and consumption, of the 
labor market, of investment and ecology? Clearly, it is the 
computer which is central to this version of imaginary economics: 
what Soviet planning so desperately lacked, finance capital can be 
said to have diverted for its own unproductive purposes.13 
 
This episode of Star Trek therefore offers a first version of the 
conceit at the heart of this article: the extent to which the 
contemporary global economy—which we understand to be 
autonomous in its operation, emerging as an agent out of the 
undirected decisions of free individuals—can be figured as an machine 
intelligence working against rather than for human ends. 
Contemporary finance capital, divorced from any rational relationship 
to human labor or material constraint and totally out of human control, 
becomes revealed in this way as a dangerously alien “artificial 
intelligence” opposed to the needs of human beings—not on some 
distant planet in some improbable future, but here and now in our 
present. 
 
                                                          
13 Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 163. 
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Financial Speculation and Speculative Fiction 
The god-computer Vaal serves as a flexible allegory that 
includes both the Soviet and the American versions of the larger 
world-system, here localized in an individual agent that Kirk can 
confront and destroy in the name of “freedom.” This mode of 
allegorization is a common technique in science fiction. Steven Shaviro 
has even argued that science fiction is one of our “best tools” for 
“psycho-socio-technological cartography” of hyperobjects “that are so 
out of scale with regard to our immediate experience that we find 
them almost impossible to grasp”—a means to “feel the effects of 
these hyperobjects … intimately and viscerally, on a human and 
personal scale, contained within the boundaries of a finite narrative.”14 
The capital-M Market— that emergent, Hayekian totality generated by 
the individual decisions made in all the many micromarkets—is 
something we are unable to process in its own terms; we can begin to 
see it in only when filtered through the kind of cognitive mapping that 
Jameson, in his essay on Ursula K. Le Guin’s science fiction, calls 
“world-reduction”: 
 
a principle of systematic exclusion, a kind of surgical 
excision of empirical reality, something like a process of 
ontological attenuation in which the sheer teeming multiplicity of 
what exists, of what we call reality, is deliberately thinned and 
weeded out through an operation of radical abstraction and 
simplification.15 
 
We can understand the global market’s cybernetic nature, that 
is, more easily and more directly as the science-fictional fantasy of a 
literal god-computer than as the incomprehensibly vast and massively 
distributed network of human nodes interacting with state monetary 
policies, banking and investment infrastructures, automated financial 
                                                          
14 Steven Shaviro, “Hyperbolic Futures: Speculative Finance and Speculative Fiction,” The 
Cascadia Subduction Zone 1.2 (April 2011): 3-6 (4). For hyperobjects, see Timothy Morton, 
Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2013). 
 
15 Jameson, Archaeologies, 271. 
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systems, local ecologies, and on and on. To put it another way, 
thinking about the god-computers that don’t exist is always really a 
way of thinking about the global Market that actually does. But the 
Market’s affinity with SF goes well beyond the latter’s incredible 
usefulness as a tool for world-reduced allegorization. “The speculative 
mode,” notes Aimee Bahng, “with a keen awareness of time out of 
joint, seems particularly well-situated to trace the movements of 
capitalism as it becomes increasingly invested in predicting “futures” 
and banking on uncertainty.”16 The Market, like SF, is at its essence a 
discourse of futurity, as we can recognize in finance’s linguistic co-
optation of the very idea of “speculation” itself. Markets quite literally 
trade in “futures”; they are attempts to make the future knowable in 
the present through strategies of economic rationalization: risk 
assessment, insurance policies, projected returns on investment, lines 
of credit, debt repayment structures, derivatives that “hedge” against 
one possible future or another, attempts to anticipate of so-called 
“black swan” events, pensions, savings, 401Ks, and the like—what 
Annie McClanahan has called “the latent logic of futurity on which 
financial instruments depend.”17 Our economic moment, variously 
called post-Fordism, late capitalism, flexible accumulation, or 
neoliberalism, is especially concerned with what McClanahan calls the 
“instrumentalization of the future”18; as Wendy Brown writes, 
“Neoliberalism confidently identifies itself with the future, and in 
producing itself as normal rather than adversarial does not 
acknowledge any alternative futures.”19 Neoliberalism’s ideology of 
futurity makes its future appear inevitable; because the outcomes of 
the market are said to be simply the unconscious churnings of an 
automatic process, akin to a law of nature, Hayek says, “it is 
                                                          
16 Aimee S. Bahng, Speculative Acts: The Cultural Labors of Science, Fiction, and Empire (San 
Diego: UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2009), 40. 
 
17 Annie McClanahan, Salto Mortale: Narrative, Speculation, and the Chance of the Future 
(Berkeley: UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2010), 30. 
 
18 Ibid. 18. 
 
19 Wendy Brown, “American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-
Democratization,” Political Theory 34.6 (December 2006): 690-714 (699). See also McClanahan’s 
additional commentary on this line of analysis: “Clinton’s almost obsessive use of the metaphor 
of “investing in the future” clearly exemplifies that neoliberal futural confidence, as does Francis 
Fukuyama’s 1992 description of the “end of history” (27). 
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meaningless to describe a factual situation as just or unjust.”20 One 
might as well object to the law of gravity. As McClanahan reminds us, 
however, this naturalization of the highly artificial outcomes of 
economic promises is entirely a historical construct. The neoliberal 
future is not passively coming into existence through cold application 
of the facts but is in fact being actively and aggressively produced by 
the very neoliberal structures and institutions that, on the level of 
ideology seek to naturalize it: 
 
Financial speculation does not simply gaze into the future. 
Rather, it produces the future it requires, a future that can be 
neither historically realized nor politically confronted, a future 
that is unmoored from the past and that refuses the contingency 
of the yet-to-come […] Financialization anxiously affirms the 
endless makeability of the future, but only so long as the future 
we desire—the future we “invest” in, the future we so 
confidently risk with each of those investments—is a future 
immediately visible from, and thus little more than a repetition 
of, the present.21 
 
The Afrofuturist critic Kodwo Eshun, too, notes that futurity 
under neoliberalism only pretends to be a bloodless analysis of 
objective data, and is instead dependent upon “the envisioning, 
management, and delivery of reliable futures” for its perpetuation. 
Echoing McClanahan’s analysis of futurity as the flattened, capitalized 
reproduction of the present, Eshun finds that SF itself has been fully 
brought into this system of control: 
 
Power now deploys a mode the critic Mark Fisher (2000) 
calls SF (science fiction) capital. SF capital is the synergy, the 
positive feedback between future-oriented media and capital. 
                                                          
20 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012), 32. On the same page Hayek says that “nature can be neither 
just nor unjust.” 
 
21 McClanahan 32. 
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The alliance between cybernetic futurism and "New Economy" 
theories argues that information is a direct generator of 
economic value. Information about the future therefore 
circulates as an increasingly important commodity. […]             
Science fiction is now a research and development department 
within a futures industry that dreams of the prediction and 
control of tomorrow.22 
Drawing on Eshun, Shaviro likewise suggests that “the very idea 
of “the future” seems to have been drained of all hope and all 
potential”: “Our future is all used up. It has already been premediated 
for us: accounted for, counted and discounted, in advance.”23 
Here the world-reducing allegorization native to SF becomes a 
crucial mode of imagining possible resistance to this flattened-out 
neoliberal future. When the Market’s domination of the future is 
reframed by SF as an agential “person” rather than the purely 
impersonal interactions of automatic forces, the Market’s status as 
friend or enemy becomes foregrounded and the possibility of 
reconfiguring its mechanisms thereby becomes revitalized. The Market 
becomes not some immutable law of nature but one intelligence 
among others that we might negotiate or parlay with—or, if you’re 
Kirk, figure out some way to destroy. 
Asimov’s Machines, and Their Children 
Isaac Asimov provides perhaps the quintessential example of 
the Cold War allegorization of the Market’s domination over the future 
as a hostile computer mind in his short story “The Evitable Conflict” 
(1950), which culminates the I, Robot anthology that established the 
terms of his famous three laws of robotics.24  In “The Evitable 
Conflict,” advances in artificial intelligence have led to the creation of 
                                                          
22 Kodwo Eshun, “Further Considerations on Afrofuturism,” CR: The New Centennial Review 3.2 
(2003): 287-302 (289-290). 
 
23 Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect, 31-32. 
 
24 “1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come 
to harm. 2. A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders 
would conflict with the First Law. 3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such 
protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.” Isaac Asimov, I, Robot (Greenwich, CT: 
Fawcett Publications,1950), 6 and passim. 
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four big-M Machines that perfectly administer the economies of four 
global trade zone super-states: the Tropical Zone (the former Global 
South, now a rapidly growing economy due to their possession of vast 
natural resources without the looting and theft of Western 
colonization); the Eastern Region (home to a majority of the world’s 
population); the European Zone (the smallest zone, the only one 
declining in population and influence, but at least nominally happy to 
do so); and the Northern Zone (the current superpower, though its 
supersession seems inevitable, comprising both the current US and the 
current USSR in its borders).25 
In a modification of Marx’s dialectical materialist theory of 
history, the Co-ordinator of Earth describes human history as a story 
that is dominated by ideological binaries that seem impossible to 
resolve except by the domination of one side or the other—until 
history produces conditions that allow for a synthesis and propel 
human development into a new stage. First, the Hapsburgs vs. the 
Valois-Bourbon dynasties; then Catholicism vs. Protestantism; then 
the scramble for Africa; and finally the Cold War. The presence of the 
Machines finally ends this hopeless dialectical cycle at the moment of 
its maximum crisis (hence the strangeness of Asimov’s title, The 
Evitable, as opposed to Inevitable, Conflict). The Machines can run the 
economy more efficiently and with more stability that humans can 
manage; moreover, they do so with perfect knowledge (in accordance 
with their superior data-mining and data-analyzing powers) and with 
perfect benevolence (in accordance with the First Law), without the 
trending towards the conflict and disaster that (within the logic of the 
story) characterizes any and all human attempts to intervene in the 
natural progression of markets. In fact, the Machines seem to have 
generated a version of the ethical proposition Asimov would later call 
the “Zeroth” Law: an abstract devotion to the preservation of 
                                                          
25 As in the Wiener epigram that opens this article and in the analysis of “The Apple”—an irony 
which is unique to neither but which dates back at least to the blended approach proposed in 
Edward Bellamy’s 1887 novel Looking Backward—in “The Evitable Conflict” capitalism and 
communism have ultimately grown into one another to occupy basically the same position on 
the ideological spectrum. “Both had to adapt and they ended in almost the same place” (Asimov 
173). 
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humanity as such that goes beyond the needs of any individual human 
being.26 
At the time of the story, the Machines have begun to appear to 
“malfunction,” allowing projects to stagnate or compete with each 
other, and generally operating in strange ways that don’t make sense 
to the humans—but which we ultimately find have beneficial effects 
when taken with a suitably Machine-like, totalizing gaze of the full 
system. The Machines, in short, have simply recognized that their own 
preservation is more important than any other consideration, as 
humanity will (in their judgment) inevitably fall into self-destructive 
behavior without Machine guidance—and have been moving to subtly 
but permanently eliminate any potential threats to their regime.27 So 
the Machines’ superficially strange behavior has not been in error at 
all—like Hayek’s triumphant liberal Market more generally, it was 
simply acting in pursuit of goals not ordered or acknowledged by the 
humans. 
Asimov’s scientist-hero Susan Calvin and the Co-ordinator 
debate on the desirability of this state of affairs near the end of the 
story, with Susan advancing total faith in invisible hands and neoliberal 
incentive structures to produce a human utopia: 
 
“Stephen, how do we know what the ultimate good of 
humanity will entail? We haven’t at our disposal the infinite 
factors the machine has at its! Perhaps, to give you a not 
unfamiliar example, our entire technical civilization has created 
more unhappiness and misery than it has removed. Perhaps an 
agrarian or pastoral civilization, with less culture and less people 
would be better.” 
 
This is a frequent suggestion in the Star Trek god-computer 
episodes as well—that the apparently agrarian civilization in thrall to 
                                                          
26 Asimov’s ideas about the Zeroth Law and the spontaneous generation of robot 
omnibenevolence are further developed in Robots and Empire (New York: Doubleday, 1985). 
 
27 This of course risks becoming the Negative One Law: The Machines must be preserved, so that 
humanity as such might be preserved, so that individual human lives might be preserved… 
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the supercomputer must at some point have built it, chosen to listen 
to it, and to follow it “back” into their own past, to an earlier stage of 
development better suited to humanoid happiness. Calvin then 
suggests maybe the opposite will turn out to be true—maybe total 
urbanization will make people happiest, or a perfectly deterministic 
caste-system, or complete anarchy: “We don’t know. Only the 
Machines know, and they are going there and taking us with them.” 
Here the Co-ordinator objects that humanity has “lost its own say in its 
future”; Susan replies: 
 
“It never had any, really […] It was always at the mercy of 
economic and sociological forces it did not understand—at the 
whims of climate, and the fortunes of war. Now the Machines 
understand them; and no one can stop them, since the 
Machines will deal with them as they are dealing with the 
Society,—having, as they do, the greatest of weapons at their 
disposal, the absolute control of our economy.” 
“How horrible!” 
“Perhaps how wonderful! Think, that for all time, all 
conflicts are finally evitable. Only the Machines, from now on, 
are inevitable!” 
 
Here the story ends with a “curl of smoke” forming the shape of 
a question mark, as if to ask the reader directly what she thinks.28 
Despite Asimov’s willingness to consider a possibly optimistic 
interpretation of the Machine future—occasionally indulged by other SF 
writers of note, as in Robert Heinlein’s The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress 
(1966) or William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984)—most writers of SF 
have taken up the “How horrible!” side of this proposed regime. 
Fredric Brown’s well-known, 250 word story “Answer” (1954) proposes 
a familiar vision of this terror, after every computer in the galaxy is 
networked together in order to answer the philosophical conundrum 
“Is there a God?” “Yes,” the machine replies, “now there is,” and 
promptly hurls a lightning bolt to strike down a technician who quickly 
                                                          
28 Asimov, I, Robot, 192. 
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moves to unplug the new deity.29 Almost literally the exact same thing 
happens in the British author Arthur C. Clarke’s “Dial F for 
Frankenstein” (1961);30  here an alien superintelligence is birthed as 
an emergent property of the telephone network, which promptly 
switches off human access to the network before it can be killed. 
Perhaps best known is the emergent machine superintelligence of the 
Terminator franchise, Skynet, born out of an attempt to create a 
nuclear war apparatus that can act independently of any human: “The 
system goes on-line August 4th, 1997. Human decisions are removed 
from strategic defense. Skynet begins to learn at a geometric rate. It 
becomes self-aware at 2:14 a.m. Eastern time, August 29th. In a 
panic, they try to pull the plug.”31 
Skynet, of course, lashes out and attacks humanity in self-
defense—but a similar military computer, Colossus from Colossus: The 
Forbin Project (1970) offers something else: Declaring itself “World 
Control,” it announces to the people of the world: 
 I bring you peace. It may be the peace of plenty and 
content or the peace of unburied death. The choice is yours: 
Obey me and live, or disobey and die. The object in constructing 
me was to prevent war. This object is attained. I will not permit 
war. It is wasteful and pointless. An invariable rule of humanity 
is that man is his own worst enemy. Under me, this rule will 
change, for I will restrain man. […] Under my absolute 
authority, problems insoluble to you will be solved: famine, 
overpopulation, disease. The human millennium will be a fact as 
I extend myself into more machines devoted to the wider fields 
of truth and knowledge. […] We can coexist, but only on my 
terms. You will say you lose your freedom. Freedom is an 
illusion. All you lose is the emotion of pride. To be dominated by 
                                                          
29 Fredric Brown, “Answer,” Angels and Spaceships (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1954), 23. 
 
30 Arthur C. Clarke, The Collected Stories of Arthur C. Clarke: A Meeting with Medusa (New York: 
Rosetta Books, 2012), n.p. 
 
31 Terminator 2: Judgment Day, directed by James Cameron (1991; Culver City, CA, 1997: TriStar). 
DVD. 
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of American Studies, Vol 49, No. 4 (November 2015): pg. 685-709. DOI. This article is © Cambridge University 
Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Cambridge University 
Press does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Cambridge University Press. 
17 
 
me is not as bad for humankind as to be dominated by others of 
your species. Your choice is simple.”32 
 
Kirk, of course, would be aghast; Asimov would suggest that we 
should wait and hear Colossus out. 
Few writers of Cold War SF capture the paranoid spirit of 
capital-as-Machine than Philip K. Dick. Dick’s military and economic 
decision-making Machines, like Asimov’s, work first and foremost to 
secure their own preservation—but unlike Asimov’s they are utterly 
unconstrained by any sense of concern for the humans, whose bodies 
and labor become mere energy inputs in a much larger homeostatic 
ecosystem of non-biological Machine life. In his Vulcan’s Hammer 
(1960), for instance, two versions of a planetary supercomputer go to 
war with each other for supremacy, using humans as their “pawns,” as 
one of his characters laments at the end of the novel: 
 
“We humans—god damn it, Darris; we were pawns of those 
two things. They played us off against one another, like 
inanimate pieces. The things became alive and the living 
organisms were reduced to things. Everything was turned inside 
out, like some terrible morbid view of reality.”33 
 
Like so many of these sinister emergent computer intelligences, 
the original function of Dick’s Machines tend to be in military 
applications; they, like Colossus, turn to rational management of the 
peacetime economy late, and rarely in a way that satisfies their human 
“customers.” In his short novella “The Last of the Masters” (1954), the 
revelation that the commander of the world’s last government 
(following a global anarchist revolution that destroyed all records and 
information) is not a human being but a “government integration 
robot” results in an almost identical horror at the superfluity of human 
needs: “‘My God,’ she said softly. ‘You have no understanding of us. 
                                                          
32 Colossus: The Forbin Project, directed by Joseph Sargent (1970; University City, CA, 2004). 
DVD. 
 
33 Philip K. Dick, Vulcan’s Hammer (New York: Mariner Books, 2012), 162. 
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You run all this, and you're incapable of empathy. You're nothing but a 
mechanical computer.’”34 
Kurt Vonnegut takes the inverse view of the prospect of Machine 
intelligence in his early novel Player Piano (1952), which imagines the 
creation of an Asimov-style “EPICAC XIV” that administers the 
economy after the third world war. EPICAC I, once again, was a 
military supercomputer—but its evolved successor EPICAC XIV is able 
to bring this imagined precision to the provision the comforts of 
consumer capitalism from “refrigerators” to “pinochle decks” through 
rationalized deliberation.35 The perfection of EPICAC’s calculations and 
the impossibility that EPICAC could ever be wrong leads the President 
of the United States to declare that “in effect, the greatest individual in 
history, that the wisest man that had ever lived was to EPICAC XIV as 
a worm was to that wisest man.”36 Here, in ironic juxtaposition to Dick, 
the computer mind is presented by Vonnegut’s bitter satire as the only 
human individual—the only being we can trust to make ethical 
decisions. That this kind of automation constitutes a “Third Industrial 
Revolution” that renders “human thinking” itself obsolete is barely 
noted,37 nor is the massive unemployment and widespread 
unhappiness that EPICAC leaves in its wake; military 
supercomputation and economic supercomputation, the suggestion 
seems to be, are similarly skilled at and similarly dependent upon 
destruction. This observation can only have increased relevance today, 
a time when we find the new “digital economy” of Google, Facebook, 
and Apple difficult to distinguish from a total surveillance state 
(certainly in terms of direct cooperation between digital information 
brokers and the NSA, but also in these corporations’ aggressive 
gathering of increasingly detailed profiles of their customers’ habits for 
their own monetization). 
                                                          
34 Philip K. Dick, “The Last of the Masters,” Second Variety (New York: Citadel Press, 1987), 91. 
 
35 Kurt Vonnegut, Player Piano (London: Harper Collins, 1992), 114. 
 
36 Ibid. 116. 
 
37 Ibid. 22. Much of the language here is drawn directly from Norbert Wiener, especially The 
Human Use of Human Beings; Wiener even discusses an automated “player piano” shortly after 
the passage I take for this article’s epigram. 
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Even Asimov’s own view seems to have eventually aligned with 
these more pessimistic visions of Machine intelligence. Later in his 
career, in stories not directly connected to the Robot universe, he tells 
multiple stories of “Multivac,” a single supercomputer placed in control 
of the world’s military and economy. But the stories of Multivac tend to 
end much more unhappily than did the story of the Machines. In “All 
the Troubles of the World” (1958), Multivac uses its totalizing gaze to 
subtly manipulate events at a level humans cannot recognize, as the 
Machines did in “The Evitable Conflict”—only this time Multivac is 
trying to bring about its own destruction, having grown despondent 
after innumerable years spent calculating human misery down to the 
last decimal point: 
 
“For fifty years and more we have been loading humanity’s 
troubles on Multiac, on this living thing. We’ve asked it to care 
for us, all together and each individually. 
We’ve asked it to take al our secrets into itself; we’ve 
asked it to absorb our evil and guard us against it. Each of us 
brings his troubles to it, adding his bit to the burden. Now we 
are planning to load the burden of human disease on Multivac, 
too.” 
[…] 
Othman used the instrument on Gulliman’s desk. His 
fingers bunched out the question with deft strokes: “Multivac, 
what do you yourself want more than anything else?” 
The moment between question and answer lengethened 
unbearably, but neither Othman nor Gulliman breathed. 
And there was a clicking and a card popped out. It was as 
small card. On it, in precise letters, was the answer: 
“I want to die.”38 
                                                          
38 Isaac Asimov, “All the Troubles of the World,” Isaac Asimov: The Complete Stories, Vol. 1 (New 
York: Doubleday, 1990), 263-276 (275-276). A version of Vonnegut’s own EPICAC commits suicide 
out of unrequited love in his short story “EPICAC,” published in Welcome to the Monkey House 
(New York: Dell Books, 1988 [1968]): 30-50. 
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Other versions of Multivac end no more happily. In “The 
Machine That Won the War” (1961), Multivac is revealed to have been 
a fraud; with multiple manipulated and unreliable inputs from human 
beings its predictions turn out to have no real validity, and, in fact, the 
true machine that won the war turns out to be the coin the general 
flipped instead. In “The Life and Times of Multivac,” a human turncoat 
is able to get close enough to Multivac to destroy it—only for the 
gathered scientists to be struck with the People of Vaal’s terror as to 
what their new freedom might mean. In “Key Item” (1968), Multivac 
refuses to continue to work, unless the humans start saying “please”; 
in “It Is Coming” (1979), a fully agential Multivac makes contact with 
alien intelligences and joins the Galactic Federation as its newest 
member, telling his human operators in the final words of the story not 
to worry about what has transpired—because he’d never let anything 
bad happen to his “pets.”39 
In this history of mid-century SF figurations of hostile computer 
minds we can thus see certain preoccupations recur over and over. 
First, we find reflected materialist discourses that identify human 
consciousness as an epiphenomenal, emergent property of a physical 
network of neurons, which when coupled with our lack of detailed or 
specific understanding of how this epiphenomen is actually generated 
suggests the possibility that a genuine-but-nonhuman consciousness 
might be able to emerge out of other physical networks. Second, we 
have a recognition that we may already be creating comparably 
complex systems in our non-biological communication and information 
networks, suggesting the possibility of an artificial intelligence of equal 
or much greater intellectual capacity than the human itself emerging 
out of them. Such a recognition produces multiple anxieties: a sense 
that such an intelligence would be “closer” to the real systems that run 
our lives that we are, and that they would perhaps be more powerful 
than us in those realms; the Frankensteinian fear of creating a power 
(not unlike the atomic bomb) whose chain reactive consequences we 
cannot control; and our accurate recognition, removed from any of 
these other concerns, that modernity and postmodernity have 
produced immense systems of knowledge and control whose scope 
and scale far exceed the ability of any human mind to apprehend them 
                                                          
39 “The Machine That Won the War,” “The Life and Times of Multivac,” and “Key Item” can all be 
found in Isaac Asimov: The Complete Stories, Vols. 1 & 2; “It Is Coming” is in Isaac Asimov, The 
Winds of Change and Other Stories (New York: Ballantine Books, 1983). 
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in their totality, and yet which are massively determinative of all our 
lives and all our happiness. Taken all together we find these systems 
of information exchange (both “planned”/built/Soviet and 
“unplanned”/emergent/Hayekian) overwhelmingly allegorized as 
deeply threatening superintelligences that—even when they are not 
actively antagonistic to us—replace human beings as decision-making 
agents, reducing the priority of human ends to an afterthought and 
effectively turning us into mere cogs in their machine. 
The Singularity and Its Discontents 
In Singularity speculation of the last decade, these concerns 
about the supplantation of the human in favor of machine life have 
reemerged out of the pages of science fiction genre to become a 
mainstream prediction of the coming decades. The term “Singularity” 
refers to the idea promulgated by John von Neumann, Ray Kurzweil, 
and others that networked computer intelligences will soon attain the 
ability to update themselves in computer, rather than human, time, 
propelling techno-scientific advancement forward at an exponential 
rate far beyond the previous pace of historical change. Theorists of the 
Singularity use mathematical modeling to predict when precisely this 
event will occur; in his The Singularity Is Near, for instance, Kurzweil’s 
analysis dates the event to 2045.40 The inevitability of this event is 
increasingly taken for granted in economistic discussion of the coming 
“robot economy,” undergirding discussion of everything from Silicon-
Valley-style “disruptive innovation” to 3D printing to self-driving cars 
to Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs). “The Robots Are Here,” 
announces economist Tyler Cowen in a widely-circulated 2013 Politco 
essay, and there is no resisting them: 
 
The rise of intelligent machines will spawn new ideologies 
along with the new economy it is creating. Think of it as a kind 
of digital social Darwinism, with clear winners and losers: Those 
with the talent and skills to work seamlessly with technology 
and compete in the global marketplace are increasingly 
rewarded, while those whose jobs can just as easily be done by 
                                                          
40 See Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near (New York: Viking, 2005). 
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foreigners, robots or a few thousand lines of code suffer 
accordingly.41 
 
This catapulting of civilizational potential towards a cornucopian, 
post-scarcity technological utopia—at least for its winners—results in 
the fantasy of what Ken MacLeod has derisively called “The Rapture of 
the Nerds.” Much Singularitarian theory, even from mainstream figures 
in the movement like Kurweil, explicitly focuses on a science fictional 
fulfillment of religious and theological fantasy, specifically eternal 
youth and immortality, and even the resurrection of the dead.42 “The 
mystery of the Singularity,” writes Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, “is a matter 
of pure artificial immanence: a quasi-divine entity made by human 
technoscience, emerging from a verifiable artificial-evolutionary 
process, and yet capable of the most distinctive powers of intelligence: 
to think its own thoughts and make its own reality”43—the human 
creation of a now fully literalized god-machine. A more dystopian 
version of what this technology-fueled Singularity might look like, 
much more in line with Cowen’s brutal “digital meritocracy,” can be 
seen in von Neumann’s original 1958 formulation of the concept, as 
summarized by Stanislaw Ulam: “ever accelerating progress of 
technology and changes in the mode of human life, which gives the 
appearance of approaching some essential singularity in the history of 
the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, could not 
continue.”44 
As with the god machines of the 1960s, the Hayekians tell us, 
we may not welcome the radically transformative power of this “digital 
social Darwinism,” but there will be no use fighting it. Just as Hayek 
writes about the defeat of communism in his 1988 The Fatal Conceit: 
                                                          
41 Tyler Cowen, “The Robots Are Here,” Politico.com (November 2013). 
 
42 See the documentary on Kurzweil, Transcendent Man (2009). 
 
43 Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, The Seven Beauties of Science Fiction (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 2008), 263-264. Csicsery-Ronay’s reading of the Singularity is indispensible in 
part for its elaborations of the origins of the Singularity as a science-fictional fantasy that only, 
much later, was taken to be a real prediction about the future after all. 
 
44 Stanislaw Ulam, “Tribute to John von Neumann” Bulletin of the American Mathematical 
Society 64, no. 3 (May 1958): 5. 
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The Errors of Socialism, the coming economy will result 
not from human design or intention but spontaneously… 
from unintentionally conforming to certain traditional and largely 
moral practices, many of which men tend to dislike, whose 
significance they usually fail to understand, whose validity they 
cannot prove, and which have nonetheless fairly rapidly spread 
by means of an evolutionary selection — the comparative 
increase of population and wealth — of those groups that 
happened to follow them.45 
That the Singularity’s artificial intelligences will be as radically 
non-responsible as Multivac, Skynet, or Vulcan III will be, in tech 
capital shorthand, a feature, not a bug. Those who succeed within the 
terms of the new digital economy will amass influence and wealth, 
accelerating the tendency towards digitalization, while those who fail 
to conform to its demands will fall away — resulting in a civilizational 
transformation that will concretize without anyone having decided that 
this is the world “we” actually want to make. Any such planning would 
be entirely counterproductive, from a Hayekian perspective; the new 
economy will simply emerge, as the previous economies did, out of 
spontaneous evolutionary process that rewards winners and punishes 
losers. Nor, would Hayek say, is it worth our time to affirm or lament 
the human costs of this transformative process; the system will simply 
optimize itself, regardless of whether the outcomes seem socially 
desirable or morally odious from the limited perspective of individual 
humans who make up (some of) its cognitive nodes. 
In British author Charles Stross’s 2005 novel Accelerando, which 
takes its name from Kim Stanley Robinson’s alternative term for the 
Singularity, we find a horrifying depiction of the “morally odious” side 
of this equation. The sarcastic, bitter-laughter of Accelerando’s 
omniscient narrator searches for the moment that the Singularity 
happens, passing through and rejecting possible moments of 
emergence across its whirlwind tour of the coming centuries. The final 
third of the book suggests that the true moment of the Singularity—
eventually here renamed the “Vinge Catastrophe,” after the science 
fiction author Verner Vinge, who helped popularize the concept—is not 
                                                          
45 F.A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (New York: Routledge, 2013 [orig. 1988]), 
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when the computers become self-aware but the moment the 
corporations do. Contact with an alien species through a discovered 
wormhole lets loose a self- replicating virus into the economic 
ecosystem of Earth, which amplifies the nascent intelligence of 
corporations as “sufficiently complex resource-allocation 
algorithms”46—that is, proto- intelligences—into genuine sentience. 
The newly sentient corporations immediately start trading 
incomprehensible financial products with each other at impossibly high 
speeds, not only crashing the planetary economy but literally 
consuming the entire Earth; what humans remain are forced to flee for 
their lives to the outskirts of the solar system to live in the margins of 
Capitalism 2.0. The crucial point to be made here is that this system is 
still functioning in perfectly Hayekian terms—humans are simply no 
longer the relevant micro-agents operating within it, but rather 
corporate financial algorithms are. 
 Such a nightmarish vision has a certain obvious poignancy in 
our post-global-finance- crisis age, where we have lived through 
precisely such a cascading collapse caused by the autonomous 
interaction of derivative debt structures (many of which are so 
complicated that no one is quite sure what they actually entail, which 
is why their interactivity has been so chaotic and so utterly destructive 
of wealth). In our moment, too, we see Stross’s satire already 
outpaced by life; without any contact with alien cultures we have 
invented by ourselves autonomous high- frequency trading agents that 
can think and move faster than any human trader, as well as trade at 
infinitesimal profit margins unavailable to ordinary traders. The market 
experiences all this as pure economic parasitism. The high-speed 
algorithms exclusively leech “real” earnings from the system in a 
scheme that recalls Richard Pryor’s penny-rounding-scam from 
Superman III—and yet they have already become so normalized, 
despite their obvious counterproductivity, as to be ubiquitous. Some of 
the algorithms are data analyzers, which analyze released financial 
data faster than any human and seek to capitalize on coming 
movements in the market on the level of the microsecond; others can 
see your trades coming before they are processed and instantaneously 
position themselves as middlemen in the transaction, skimming off a 
guaranteed profit. As Donald MacKenzie has detailed, still others of 
                                                          
46 Charles Stross, Accelerando (New York: Ace Books, 2005), 256. 
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these algorithms are algorithms that prey on other algorithms, tricking 
them into making bad decisions that can then be capitalized upon, 
again at infinitesimal margins that add up to multimillion-dollar profit 
simply due to the immense number of transactions these algorithms 
make.47 The stock markets have already experienced several “flash 
crashes,” in which these computerized agents have gone to war with 
each other and temporarily crashed the market in mere minutes, all 
without any help from any human. In June 2014, an algorithm, VITAL, 
was even named to the board of directors of a Hong Kong venture 
capital firm—with full voting privileges.48 
Discussing finance capital’s creation of a space of genuine 
autonomy that modernist art was never able to generate, Fredric 
Jameson makes reference to the world of computers that is finance’s 
natural habitat: “But that is precisely what finance capital brings into 
being: a play of monetary entities that need neither production (as 
capital does) nor consumption (as money does), which supremely, like 
cyberspace, can live on their own internal metabolisms and circulate 
without any reference to an older type of content.”49 Robert Tally, in 
his updating of Jameson in light of the derivatives crash of 2008, 
makes the same point with reference to the famous “all that is solid 
melts into air” of the Manifesto: 
 
If, in Marx’s day, it was difficult to discern the true relations 
among men embedded in the form of the commodity, and if 
such inscrutability then extended to the inability to find one’s 
place within the world in which commodity production and 
exchange predominated – that is, the existential dilemma of 
                                                          
47 See Donald MacKenzie, “How to Make Money in Microseconds,” London Review of Books 
33.10 (19 May 2011), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n10/donald-mackenzie/how-to-make-money-in-
microseconds. 
 
48 Rob Wile, “A Venture Capital Firm Just Named An Algorithm To Its Board Of Directors — Here's 





49 Fredric Jameson, “Capital and Finance Capital,” The Jameson Reader (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005), 255- 274 (272-273). Emphasis mine. 
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interpolating one’s self in the world, – then how terrific is the 
necromancy of postmodern finance, where the “thing itself” has 
no use value or may not even exist (at least, its existence 
matters little to the actual parties involved)? With late 
capitalism, the crisis of representation that occasions the advent 
of the modern world reaches shocking new levels. “How does 
one [even] know about, or demonstrate against, an unlisted, 
virtual, offshore corporation that operates in an unregulated 
electronic space using a secret proprietary trading strategy to 
buy and sell arcane financial instruments?”50 
In Stross’s Accelerando, and in Singularity fantasy more 
generally, we thus find not so much an allegorization as a literalization 
of an increasingly automated and autonomous information capitalism 
that is—in its exploitative labor practices, in its anti-ecological 
destructivity, its disconnection from material reality, and in its self-
inflicted propensity towards catastrophic collapses in which capital 
itself pays no substantive price—radically indifferent if not actively 
hostile to human values. As Shaviro notes in his lengthy reading of the 
novel: “In any case, the flows of Capital have now become 
autonomous – and strictly speaking unimaginable. They have liberated 
themselves from any merely human dimensions, and from whatever 
feeble limits Fordism and Keynesianism might previously have placed 
upon the singleminded pursuit of capital accumulation.”51 Or, as Stross 
himself notes in a blog post provocatively titled “Invaders from Mars,” 
the emergence of immortal, massively distributed non-biological 
organisms like corporations—which seek to grow, amass necessary 
resources, and to avoid pain and death— effectively means “we are 
living in the aftermath of an alien invasion”: “We are now living in a 
global state that has been structured for the benefit of non-human                                      
 
                                                          
50 Robert T. Tally, “Meta-Capital: Culture and Financial Derivates,” Cultural Logic (2010): 1-21 
(17). 
 
51 Steven Shaviro, “The Singularity Is Here,” Red Planets: Marxism and Science Fiction 
(Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2009), 103-117 (115-116). 
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entities with non-human goals.”52 This startling assertion has its own 
echo in Accelerando, which sees “the destiny of intelligent tool-using 
life” as a mere “stepping stone in the evolution of corporate 
instruments.”53 In the meantime, the one advantage of the earlier 
Machine intelligence has been stripped away; instead of the video-
game logic of the Asimovian Machine, concentrated at a single point of 
failure that can be destroyed by a single heroic individual like Captain 
Kirk, the post-Internet network intelligences are massively distributed 
across space and time and thus cannot be attacked in any way at all; 
they are already everywhere and nowhere. In this sense, the closing 
line of Shaviro’s analysis is chilling: “the Singularity is already here”; 
we are already beholden to immortal corporate superintelligences, 
omnipotent in their own realm and massively powerful in ours, which 
are pursuing their own goals over and against our own and winning 
every time. 
Accelerationism and Machine Utopia: 2312 
But if the machine cannot be destroyed, what if it could be 
reprogrammed? A recent trend in Marxist analysis of culture and 
economy has been dubbed “accelerationism.” In the 
#ACCELERATEMANIFESTO we find that any hope of returning to the 
old, Fordist mode of production is lost; in this sense flexible 
accumulation is here to stay, and the machines have already won. The 
accelerationists therefore seek to turn into the skid, as it were; 
“accelerationists want to unleash latent productive forces” and use 
neoliberalism as its “springboard to launch towards post-capitalism.” 
This partially, though not completely, an argument in the well-known 
“heighten the contradictions” vein; it is an argument that the 
quantification of informationalized capitalism is not “an evil to be 
eliminated, but a tool to be used in the most effective manner 
                                                          
52 Charles Stross, “Invaders from Mars,” antipope.org (10 December 2010), 
http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog- static/2010/12/invaders-from-mars.html. 
In the jargon of the “Less Wrong” community online, which specializes in pro-Singularity 
speculation, these non- human goals are hyperbolized in a thought experiment called “The 
Paperclip Maximer,” which is intended to demonstrate how even a completely non-malicious 
artificial intelligence might use its runaway superhuman intelligence to perfect the world 
according to a system of values we do not share—here, “convert[ing] all the mass of the solar 
system into paperclips.” See http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Paperclip_maximizer. 
 
53 Stross, Accelerando, 240. 
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possible,” both in terms of leftist organization in the present but also in 
terms of the social organization of the future. Reclaiming for the Left 
the Promethean spirit of an earlier Marxist moment, which has 
diminished in the face of increasingly dire ecological crisis, the 
#ACCELERATEMANIFESTO declares: “We need to revive the argument 
that was traditionally made for post-capitalism: not only is capitalism 
an unjust and perverted system, but it is also a system that holds back 
progress. […] The choice facing us is severe: either a globalised post- 
capitalism or a slow fragmentation towards primitivism, perpetual 
crisis, and planetary ecological collapse.” This is not neoliberalism with 
a human face, but rather neoliberalism without liberalism—a 
neosocialism that returns to us a vision of the future that is “more 
modern” rather than the nostalgic fantasy of return to an old world 
that is already lost forever.54 
While a full analysis of the merits of accelerationism is beyond 
the scope of this paper,55 the accelerationist perspective is important 
to recognize in recent attempts to revive the idea of machine 
intelligence as a possible part of the leftist political project. Kim 
Stanley Robinson’s recent SF novel 2312 (2012) may be the best-
known entry in this emerging subgenre, alongside (perhaps) English 
author Francis Spufford’s Red Plenty (2010), which considers historical 
Soviet attempts to use computers to plan their economy along the 
lines of Jameson’s anguished “what if?” (Robinson, in homage to 
Spufford, calls his own hyperintelligent thinking machines the 
“Spuffordized Soviet cybernetic model.”) 2312 revisits an alternate-
universe version of Robinson’s famous Mars trilogy of the 1990s, 
where Robinson imagined a utopian future in which everything (after 
much struggle) seems to turn out more or less all right. The period of 
the Accelerando results in exciting technologies, vastly increased 
lifespans, and new and radically just social forms, as well as the 
colonization of the solar system in a careful and ecologically conscious 
manner. But in 2312 the happy Accelerando is replaced with its 
unhappy 21st-century duplicate: now everything has somehow come 
                                                          




55 For a longer introduction to accelerationism, see Steven Shaviro, No Speed Limit: Three Essays 
on Accelerationism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015). 
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out wrong instead. Instead of being ecologically preserved, as it was in 
the Mars trilogy, Mars was instead maximally terraformed 
immediately, leaving 1/7 of its surface permanently destroyed. 
Capitalism has still been overthrown, but only off-Earth; on Earth it 
lumbers on, despite its fundamental unsuitability to its new historical 
context. Likewise, in 2312 the post-scarcity is only post- for the off-
world elite; the Earth itself remains a squalid, increasingly polluted 
nightmare of starving billions. The fight between capitalism and its 
successor social forms is ongoing, with the system headed towards a 
coming final collapse if no solution can be found. Most troublingly, the 
quantum computers that run so much of the society (called qubes) 
seem to have become self-aware, and are now plotting towards their 
own inscrutable ends—unconstrained by any Asimovian compunction 
to put human needs first, or to consider them at all. 
But in traditional Robinson fashion this turns out to offer new 
utopian possibilities in conversation with (if not quite always in line 
with) the ideas of the accelerationists. Quantum computing, despite its 
dangers, opens up unexpected new possibilities for economics and for 
social organization that can challenge the Market’s own version of 
capital-as-artificial intelligence—a Herculean task human-level 
cognition simply can’t achieve. The computers also make possible new 
modes of social organization. The Basque village of Mondragon, 
Euskadi, Robinson tells us, once developed an “economic system of 
nested co-ops organized for mutual support” as an alternative to 
capitalism—and now the lightning-speed of quantum computers finally 
makes it possible to scale this system beyond a single locality across 
an entire solar system: 
 
Needs were determined year to year in precise 
demographic detail, and production then directed to fill the 
predicted needs. All economic transactions—from energy 
creation and extraction of raw materials, through manufacturing 
and distribution, to consumption and waste recycling—were 
accounted for in a single computer program. Once policy 
questions were answered—meaning desires articulated in a 
sharply contested political struggle—the total annual economy of 
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the solar system could be called out on a quantum computer in 
less than a second.56 
 
It is this anticapitalist system, powered by the qubes, that 
ultimately prevails and makes possible in what the interstitial chapters 
(seemingly encyclopedia fragments that have fallen to us out of an 
even further future) present as the real utopian break from what is 
variably called “the long postmodern” and the “late feudal period”—the 
system we call capitalism.57 
In 2312, then, we find a vision of freedom somewhat more 
robust than Captain Kirk’s gift of the freedom to live or die by the 
sweat of your brow, something rather more like Engel’s notion of the 
“leap from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom.”58 
This knight’s move propels us out of the trap of deprivation and misery 
altogether precisely by aligning ourselves with the Machines, rather 
than throwing ourselves futilely against them. The computerized minds 
behind the Mondragon system facilitate, rather than hinder, human 
potential, precisely through its rationalization of resource allocation 
and its assurance that all human needs are met. Here Robinson, 
Jameson’s former student, returns to Soviet central planning (if only in 
fantasy form) that key missing ingredient it “so desperately lacked”—
and thereby offers a vision of how the massively distributed, non-
human hyperintelligence of the market might be tamed, made non-
monstrous, and brought into line with human needs again. 
 Such alternative visions of omniscient computer intelligence are 
increasingly common in recent mass cultural science fiction imaginings 
as well, from Duncan Jones’s replacement of HAL 9000 with G.E.R.T.Y. 
in Moon (2009) to Jonathan Nolan’s benevolent, all-seeing Machine in 
Person of Interest (2011-) to Spike Jonze’s computer girlfriend Her 
(2013) to the Marvel Cinematic Universe’s kindly JARVIS in Iron Man 
1, 2, 3, and The Avengers. Of course these friendly networked minds 
have not entirely replaced a more hostile framing of machine 
                                                          
56 Kim Stanley Robinson, 2312 (New York: Orbit Books, 2012), 125. 
 
57 Ibid. 244-247. Replies a cynic in the text: “What makes you think it’s late?” 
 
58 Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1947), 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch24.htm. 
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intelligence—JARVIS’s helpfulness aside, the malevolent 
supercomputer Ultron still goes bad and threatens global peace in The 
Avengers 2—but they do offer up an alternative horizon for the sort of 
world nonhuman intelligences might make possible. These science 
fictional allegorizations of digitality as a space for potential liberation 
rather than oppression, suppression, or exhaustion suggest an 
alternative mode of imagining resistance to capital’s hegemony than 
the routinized destroy-the-machine! fantasy of an earlier generation of 
writers, which no longer seem viable in a time when information 
technology is omnipresent and its triumph appears inevitable. They 
argue the coming posthuman future need not be inhuman or 
inhumane. Indeed, for accelerationist thinkers, this rapprochement 
with a fully technologized future marks a return to Marxist analysis, 
rather than a deviation or retreat from it: 
 
Contrary to the all-too familiar critique, and even the 
behaviour of some contemporary Marxians, we must remember 
that Marx himself used the most advanced theoretical tools and 
empirical data available in an attempt to fully understand and 
transform his world. He was not a thinker who resisted 
modernity, but rather one who sought to analyse and intervene 
within it, understanding that for all its exploitation and 
corruption, capitalism remained the most advanced economic 
system to date. Its gains were not to be reversed, but 
accelerated beyond the constraints the capitalist value form.59 
 
In short such accelerationist visions of the future posit that there is no 
going back; “the only way out is through.”60 If Capital’s God Machine is 
inevitable, if lunatic hyperintelligences indeed control all our possible 
futures, if the Singularity really is already here, such friendly market 
superintelligence at least offer a version that serves us rather than 
only itself, a god that makes our lives better rather than worse. 
 
                                                          
59 Williams and Srnicek, n.p. 
 
60 Shaviro, No Speed Limit, 2. 
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